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CAUSATION AND INJURY IN CORPORATE CONTROL
TRANSACTIONS: CEDE & CO. v. TECHNICOLOR, INC.
Jacqueline M. Veneziani
Abstract: In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court held that
shareholders are not required to prove injury from corporate directors' failure to exercise due
care in approving a merger transaction. Tort principles, the court stated, have no role in a
business judgment rule analysis. Therefore, once shareholders prove a violation of the
directors' duty of care, the burden is shifted to the directors to prove the entire fairness of the
transaction despite the absence of a breach of the duty of loyalty. This Note argues that the
entire fairness review of a disinterested board transaction is unworkable. Rather, courts
should use tort principles to analyze a breach of the duty of care, and those principles require
plaintiffs to prove causation and resulting injury. Because proving causation to an absolute
certainty in the corporate control setting can be forbidding, this Note proposes a "substantial
lost chance" causation standard as a more viable alternative.

In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court shocked the corporate world.
The court found in Smith v. Van Gorkom' that the corporate directors of
Trans Union Corporation were not entitled to the protection of the
business judgment rule and had breached their duty of care in evaluating
and approving a merger offer.2 Before this decision, courts had rarely
found individual directors liable for breaching their duty of care absent
accompanying disloyal acts.3 In Van Gorkom, however, the court found
liability based solely on the directors' failure to inform themselves
properly before approving a takeover.4 The court awarded damages
consisting of the difference between the fair value of the stock and the
offered price.' The decision provoked strong criticism and extensive
1. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
2. Id. at 888.
3. Before Van Gorkom was decided, one commentator had stated that "[t]he search for cases in
which directors... have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by selfdealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack." Joseph W. Bishop,
Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of CorporateDirectorsand
Officers, 77 Yale L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968). But see Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate
Director'sDuty of Care: Riddles Wisely Expounded, 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 923, 945-46 (1990)
(disputing Prof. Bishop's statement and noting that there are actually many cases upholding duty of
care violations).
4. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888. The directors were grossly negligent because they approved the
merger after only two hours' deliberation, without prior notice, and without the existence of an
emergency. Id. at 874.
5. Id. at 893. Before damages were assessed, the directors agreed to settle for $23.5 million.
Luckily for the directors, the acquiring Pritzker group agreed to pay the difference between the $10
million liability insurance coverage and the settlement amount. Craig W. Hammond, Note, Limiting
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commentary because Delaware courts rarely second-guessed decisions
made by experienced directors. 6 Lost in the furor, however, was any
consideration by the court of the burden of proof plaintiffs carried in
proving damages.7 Most commentators assumed that damages for duty
of care violations were based on the tort principle that the plaintiff had
the burden of proving all foreseeable injuries resulting from the negligent
act.

8

In 1993, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc.9 surprised the corporate world again. 10 A Technicolor
shareholder sued the company's directors in a personal liability action,
claiming that the directors breached their fiduciary duaties in the approval
of a merger transaction. The court ruled that once the shareholder
plaintiff proved that the directors had breached their duty of care and
were not entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule, the
plaintiff was not required to prove actual causation and injury in order to
recover monetary damages."' Upon proof of a breach of due care, the
Directors' Duty of CareLiability: An Analysis of Delaware's CharterAmendment Approach, 20 U.
Mich. J.L. Ref. 543, 544 n.6 (1987).
6. See, e.g., Krishnan Chittur, The Corporate Director'sStandard of Care: Past, Present, and
Future, 10 Del. J. Corp. L. 505 (1985); Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the
Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. Law. 1437 (1985); Bayless Manning, Reflections and PracticalTips on
Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. Law. 1 (1985); E. Norman Veasey, Further
Reflections on CourtReview ofJudgments of Directors:Is the JudicialProcess Under Control?,40
Bus. Law. 1373 (1985); E. Norman Veasey & Julie M.S. Seitz, The Bu;iness Judgment Rule in the
Revised Model Act, the Trans Union Case, and the ALI Project-A St-ange Porridge,63 Tex. L.
Rev. 1483 (1985). Van Gorkom spurred the enactment of state statute3 that allow shareholders to
adopt charter provisions eliminating or limiting a director's liability for monetary damages for a
breach of the duty of care. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991). The crisis in director
and officer (D & 0) liability insurance, in part caused by an increase in litigation, also prompted
these statutes. Skyrocketing premiums had resulted in inadequate D & 0 coverage, leading many
individuals to decline to serve as corporate directors. Stephen A. Radin, The Director'sDuty of
Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom, 39 Hastings L.J. 707,744-45 (1988).
7. Combined Opening Brief of Respondent/Defendants Appellees and Cross-Appellants at 118,
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (Nos. 336 & 337).
8. Principlesof CorporateGovernance: Analysis and Recommendations (Proposed Final Draft
1992) [hereinafter Principles], §§ 4.01(d) & 7.18(c); Dennis J. Block et al., The Business Judgment
Rule 29 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991); Ernest L. Folk III et al., Folk on the Delaware General
Corporation Law § 141:28 (3d ed. 1993); Norman D. Lattin, Lattin on Corporations276 (2d ed.
1971); Hammond, supra note 5, at 544 n.6.
9. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). Plaintiffs were Cinerama, Inc., the shareholder, and Cede & Co., the
owner of record.
10. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Director Fiduciary Duties and Entire Fairness
Standard, N.Y. L.J., January 20, 1994, at 5; Karen Donovan, Corporate Directors Take Beating
From Del. Supreme Court,Nat'l L.., Dec. 27, 1993/Jan. 3, 1994, at 17; William Klein II, Delaware
Directors:Take Careor Beware,N.Y. L., Dec. 23, 1993, at 5.
11. Cede, 634 A.2d at 371.
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burden shifted to the defendant directors to prove that the transaction was
entirely fair.'" Tort principles, it proclaimed, had no role in a business
judgment rule analysis. 3 The court's ruling has provoked strong
criticism. 4
This Note asserts that the Cede court wrongly decided the proof of
damages issue. After analyzing the director's duty of care in corporate
control transactions, this Note concludes that proof of causation and
injury should be required elements of the plaintiffs case." Shifting the
burden to the directors to prove the entire fairness of the transaction is
inappropriate when the directors are disinterested. Furthermore, despite
the court's contention that prior case law controlled, no Delaware cases
have addressed the burden of proof that plaintiffs must bear in proving
causation. Courts should use tort principles to analyze the director's
duty of care; those principles require proof of causation and injury as
necessary elements of the plaintiffs case-in-chief. Recognizing the
difficult burden that a stringent "but for" causation requirement would
impose upon plaintiffs, however, this Note considers alternative
approaches to proof of causation. Building on the lessons learned in the
medical and legal malpractice context, this Note proposes that when
directors breach their duty of care in making corporate control decisions,
shareholders should be required to prove a "substantial lost chance" to
satisfy the causation requirement.
I.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

Corporate directors owe fiduciary duties of both care and loyalty to
the corporations they serve. The business judgment rule protects
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. One commentator described the result as creating director liability for "negligence in the air"
and an "open invitation to litigate these cases." Donovan, supra note 10, at 23 (quoting Prof.
Michael P. Dooley).
15. Corporate control transactions include buying or selling plants, acquiring or being acquired,
increasing or decreasing leverage, going public or private, and selling stock and buying it back.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of CorporateLaw 109 (1991).
The Cede court did not restrict its holding to the corporate control setting. Corporate control
transactions, however, are litigated frequently. They also present some of the most important,
complicated, and, from a director's perspective, expensive areas of corporate litigation. Therefore,
this Note concentrates on the effect that this ruling will have on corporate control transactions.
Furthermore, this Note focuses primarily on Delaware corporate law. The influence of Delaware
corporate law is nationwide. More than 40% of New York Stock Exchange companies and more
than 50% of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware. Klein, supra note 10, at 5.
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directors from liability for decisions made in accordance with their
fiduciary duties. If the business judgment rule is satisfied, corporate
directors will not be held liable for any loss arising from a business
decision. Historically, however, courts have treated the implications of
breaches of the duty of care as distinct from breaches of the duty of
loyalty. In corporate control transactions in which both the duties of
loyalty and care are implicated, separating judicial analyses of the two
duties is difficult.
A.

FiduciaryDuties of CorporateDirectors

Corporate directors manage the affairs of a corporation. 6 In
performing their obligations, directors owe unyielding fiduciary duties to
the corporation and its shareholders. 7 The principal fiduciary duties are
the duty of care and the duty of loyalty."5
The duty of care imposes a standard for director behavior that is
generally familiar throughout the law of negligence: that a person who
undertakes conduct presenting the risk of injury to others must perform
that role carefully. 9 In corporation law, the duly of care requires
directors to exercise the care that an ordinarily prudent person would
exercise under similar circumstances. 0 There are two distinct aspects to
a director's duty of care: due care in decision making, 2' which is subject
16. "The business affairs of every corporation ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors." Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991). See also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 811 (Del. 1984). The delegation of corporate authority to directors by shareholders enables
skilled managers to run companies and investors lacking managerial skills to reap the benefits of the
directors' expertise. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corpora'eControl Transactions,91
Yale L.J. 698, 700 (1982).
17. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). The divergence of corporate ownership and
control creates monitoring costs of the directors' actions. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., JudicialReview of
FiduciaryDecisionmaking-Some TheoreticalPerspectives, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1985). The
imposition of legally created fiduciary duties is a response to those monitoring costs. Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 16, at 702.
18. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985). See also Block et al., supranote 8,
at 1. Embodied in these fiduciary duties is the duty of candor discussed ifraat note 54.
19. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of CorporateDirectors and Officers, 51 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 945, 945 (1990).
20. Unlike the majority of other states, Delaware has no statutory formulation of the duty of care.
Delaware case law, however, describes a duty in words almost identical to those in a majority of
state statutes: "[D]irectors ...in managing ... corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care
which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circunstances." Graham v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). See also Revised Model Business Corp. Act §
8.30(a) (1984).
21. Veasey & Seitz, supranote 6, at 1493.
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to business judgment rule protection,22 and due care required of directors
in carrying out their general responsibilities in delegation and oversight.23
Courts normally characterize a corporate control decision of the type in
Cede as one involving due care in decision making, not general oversight
responsibilities.24
In addition, unlike other areas in the law of
negligence, Delaware imposes liability only for grossly negligent lapses
of due care in decision making.2
Under the duty of loyalty, a director must scrupulously work to
protect the interests of the corporation and its shareholders and refrain
from conduct that would result in improper personal benefits.26 Hence,
directors must avoid any conflicts between their official position and
their own self-interest. The duty of loyalty is implicated if directors use
their positions to effect or further a transaction between the corporation
and that director. If the transaction is not fair to the corporation, a breach
of the duty of loyalty is committed.2 8 Such violations may include fraud,
bad faith, and self-dealing. 9 Actions that have the primary purpose of
22. See infra notes 35-72 and accompanying text.
23. Veasey & Seitz, supra note 6, at 1493. See also Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment
and the Director'sDuty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. Law. 1477, 1494 (1984) (explaining
that directors make discrete decisions and have general oversight functions). To satisfy the oversight
component of the duty of care, directors must ensure that the officers of the corporation are properly
managing its business and affairs. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130. Some of those oversight functions
include ensuring compliance with the law, monitoring management, maintaining a financial
reporting system and information system, and informing management of major corporate
developments. Manning, supra, at 1499; Veasey & Seitz, supra note 6, at 1503. In carrying out
their oversight functions, however, directors may delegate to subordinates if the decision to delegate
is made with due care. Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381, 395-96 (Del. Ch. 1961). Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 141(e) (1991) also allows good faith reliance on information provided by officers or employees of
the corporation.
24. Cases charging lapses in the duty of care for general oversight responsibilities normally arise
in the midst of a corporate failure or a series of poor business judgments over a prolonged period of
time. This Note does not address directors' due care in oversight. For a discussion of the director's
general oversight functions, see Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
25. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873
(Del. 1985). The Delaware standard of care in the oversight context, however, is ordinary
negligence. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 972 (Del. Ch. 1986). See also
Francis, 432 A.2d at 823 (imposing standard of ordinary care on directors for oversight
responsibilities).
26. Folk et al., supranote 8, § 141:12.
27. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
28. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988). Conflict of
interest transactions are not automatically voidable if a fully-informed majority of disinterested
directors properly applies its business judgment in good faith to authorize the transaction or if
approval of fully informed and disinterested shareholders has been secured. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§144(a) (1991). See also Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57,59 (Del. 1952).
29. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
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entrenching the directors in office, such as unreasonably resisting a
takeover, are also violations of the duty of loyalty.3"
Courts historically have scrutinized alleged violations of the duty of
loyalty more thoroughly than violations of the duty of care.31 Breaches
of the duty of loyalty warrant higher scrutiny becaus. they implicate the
fundamental reason for fiduciary principles: the divergence of the
directors' interests from those of the shareholders.32 Unlike breaches of
the duty of care, which are often punished by the market in the form of
competition from efficiently run firms, duty of loyalty cases often
involve "take the money and run" appropriations in which subsequent
market penalties are inadequate deterrents in preventing future lapses in
the duty.33 Therefore, judicially enforced liability rules are needed to
supplement market penalties for duty of loyalty breaches.34
B.

The BusinessJudgment Rule

1.

The Elements of the Rule

The business judgment rule, as fashioned by Delaware courts,35
applies the directorial fiduciary duties to a discrete decision.36 Delaware
30. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953-55 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986). Other situations that
implicate breaches of the duty of loyalty include dealings by a corporate parent with its subsidiaries,
directors taking advantage of corporate opportunities, competition by directors with the corporation,
and excessive compensation paid to directors. David S. Ruder, Duty ofLoyalt -A Law Professor's
StatusReport, 40 Bus. Law. 1383, 1386-87 (1985).
31. One famous case states the following about the duty of loyalty:
A public policy.., derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives,
has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director... the most scrupulous
The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
observance of his duty ....
corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). See also AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson,
Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986); Easterbrook & Fisch.il, supra note 15, at 103.
32. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 91. See also Guth, 5 A.2d at 510 (finding duty of
loyalty violation so uncompromising that liability does not rest upon proof of injury to corporation).
33. Easterbrook & Fischel, supranote 15, at 103. In fact, because of the market's failure to deter
breaches of the duty of loyalty, Professor David M. Phillips would reformulate the duty of care to
address what he sees as the primary risk to corporations: the risk of unfair self-dealing. David M.
Phillips, Principlesof CorporateGovernance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 653,
692-98 (1984).
34. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 103.
35. There is a lack of consensus on the business judgment rule. The drafters of the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act abandoned their attempt to formulate the rule because of its ongoing
judicial development. Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 8.30 official comment at 220-21 (1984).
The ALI's formulation met with considerable controversy over the 15-year development of the
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courts describe the rule as both a procedural and a substantive rule of
law.37 The procedural element of the rule contains the presumption that
in reaching decisions, directors "acted on an informed basis [i.e., with
due care], in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company."38 A shareholder wishing to
challenge a discrete decision by directors must rebut the presumption by
producing evidence of director self-interest, or that the directors either
lacked good faith or failed to exercise due care.3 9 If the plaintiff
overcomes any element of the presumption, the directors are not afforded
the protection of the business judgment rule.4"
In all, the business judgment rule contains five elements:4" a discrete
business decision, 42 disinterestedness, 43 due care, 44 good faith, 4S and no
abuse of discretion 6 When each element of the rule is satisfied, the
substantive component of the business judgment rule prohibits a court
from substituting its judgment for that of the directors. 47 The business
judgment rule also provides that there is no liability for an injury or loss

Principlesof Corporate GovernanceProject. See William J. Carney, Section 4.01 of the American
Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: Restatement or Misstatement?, 66 Wash. U. L.Q.
239, 239-52 (1988).
36. Block et al., supranote 8, at 2.
37. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989).
38. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
39. Id. Some commentators have pointed out that the "presumption" aspect of the business
judgment rule is confusing. As in any civil action, the plaintiff already has the burden of proof on
every element of the case. Therefore, it is misleading to say that a party with the burden of proof
must also overcome a "presumption." R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the
Business Judgment Rule, 48 Bus. Law. 1337, 1345 (1993). However, the effect of the presumption
may be to require particularized pleading and increased amounts of evidence. Id. at 1347-52.
40. See Aronson, 519 A.2d at 812.
41. Block et al., supra note 8, at 12.
42. "[T]he business judgment rule operates only in the context of director action ....[I]t has no
role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or ...failed to act." Aronson, 473 A.2d at
813. Nonetheless, a conscious decision not to act may be protected by the rule. Id.
43. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
45. Director action must be motivated by an honest desire to benefit the corporation's
shareholders. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. One of the most common allegations of bad faith concerns
an attempt by directors to entrench themselves in office during a corporate control transaction. See,
e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
46. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Courts may review a directorial decision to see if it falls within the
bounds of reason. The most common example of this review is to determine if there has been a
waste of corporate assets, which is a cause of action in its own right. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc.,
316 A.2d 599,615 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
47. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
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to the corporation arising from the decision.4" Therefore, a determination
that each of the elements has been satisfied mandates that the court find
in favor of the directors.49
2.

The FundamentalElements of the Business Judgment Rule: Due
Careand Disinterestedness

Liability for directors usually hinges on whether the disinterestedness
and due care components of the business judgiment rule, which
correspond to the traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, have
been met." Prior to Cede, a violation of either component traditionally
had distinct results. The business judgment rule presumes that directors
possess a disinterested independence and do not stand on both sides of a
transaction in a way that prevents an unbiased exercise ofjudgment.5" If
the plaintiff is able to plead and prove facts sufficient to show that a
majority of the board was interested, the business jud:ment rule does not
apply, and the burden shifts to the directors to prove that the transaction
was entirely fair. 2 Under this "entire fairness" standard of review, the
directors must make a very exacting showing encompassing both fair
dealing and fair price.13 "Fair dealing" involves the timing of the
transaction and how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, and disclosed
to the shareholders.54 "Fair price" includes all the relevant factors
comprising a company's intrinsic worth such as assets, market value,
48. S. Samuel Arsht, The BusinessJudgment Rule Revisited, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 93, 111-12 (1979);
R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, The Delaware Law of Corporationsand Business
Organizations § 4.6, at 76 (1989). Joseph Hinsey distinguishes between the business judgment rule
which shields directors who act in good faith from personal liability, and the business judgment
doctrine, which allows a court to enjoin a directors' decision but not to determine personal director
liability. Joseph Hinsey IV, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate
Governance Project: the Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 609, 611-13
(1984).
49. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989). The ALI labels
the rule a "safe harbor" for corporate directors and officers. Principles,stpranote 8, § 4.01 cmt. d.
50. See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
51. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. See also Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001 (N.Y. 1979).
52. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983); AC Acquisitions Corp. v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. 1986); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93
A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952).
53. Weinberger,457 A.2d at 711. Depending on the posture of the proceedings, the court can
also enjoin the transaction. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del.
1989).
54. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. One aspect of fair dealing is the duty of candor owed by
corporate directors to disclose all material information relevant to corp rate decisions which may
bestow a personal benefit on the directors. Mills, 559 A.2d at 1280.
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Normally, courts apply this entire
earnings, and future prospects."
involving a merger or sale of
transactions
to
self-dealing
review
fairness
6
In an auction for corporate
assets between related corporations.
control, entire fairness mandates that directors commit themselves,
inexorably, to obtaining the highest value reasonably attainable to the
shareholders.57
In addition to disinterestedness, directors are presumed to have
satisfied the due care component of the business judgment rule. To
overcome this presumption, plaintiffs must show that the directors were
grossly negligent in informing themselves of all material information
reasonably available to them.58 The more significant the decision is, the
higher the directors' responsibility is to have an informed basis for their
decision. 9 The most significant decisions are corporate control
decisions, which involve changes to the basic structure, or continuing
existence, of the corporation. 0 These decisions place a special burden on
directors to reach a decision in a deliberative manner. A plaintiff seeking
to establish a breach of the duty of care, assuming no other breach of
fiduciary duties, must plead and prove facts sufficient to overcome the
presumption that directors were not grossly negligent in reaching a
decision.6
The due care element of the business judgment rule has been the focus
of considerable attention in the corporate control context. Since Van
Gorkom,62 Delaware and other jurisdictions have carefully examined the
process a board uses to inform itself of all material aspects of a corporate

55. Weinberger,457 A.2d at 711. The Weinberger court, however, recognized that the test for
fairness is not a bifurcated one. Rather, the entire fairness of the transaction as a whole must be
scrutinized by the court. Id. The real objective is to determine whether a truly independent board
would have produced a similar transaction. Id. at 709 n.7.
56. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985). But see Shamrock Holdings,
Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257,275 (Del. Ch. 1989) (applying entire fairness review to board's
adoption of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP)).
57. Mills, 559 A.2d at 1280.
58. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985). See also Hanson Trust PLC v. ML
SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264,274-75 (2d Cir. 1986).
59. Folk et al., supra note 8, § 141:11. In a takeover situation, the court describes the board's
duty as "enhanced" because the board may be acting to entrench itself rather than in the best interests
of the corporation. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
60. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 109.
61. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73.
62. See generally Radin, supra note 6 (discussing due care decisions in aftermath of Van
Gorkom).
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control decision before making its decision.63 Some of the factors courts
consider in weighing whether a board is informed include the following:
whether the board had a majority of outside directors,' whether the
corporation created a special committee of outside directors,65 the extent
to which the board consulted with outside and inside financial advisors
and legal counsel,66 and whether outside directors questioned advisors
and management. 67 In addition, courts have referred to pre-meeting
distribution of material documentation; 68 discussion of the transaction at
an extensive meeting, 69 rather than a perfunctory meeting;7" and
directors' use of the time they have.71 No single factor, however, is
dispositive. As long as the court is satisfied that the decision-making
process is informed, even a bad substantive outcome will not be
questioned absent bad faith or a conflict of interest.72
3.

The RelationshipBetween the Business Judgment Rule and the
Duty of Care

The business judgment rule shields directors from liability when all of
the elements of the rule have been satisfied. Acccrdingly, a plaintiff
seeking to establish a breach of the duty of care first must overcome the
presumption afforded by the business judgment rule." If the plaintiff is
able to prove that the directors were grossly negligent in making a
discrete decision, the burden shifts to the directors to prove that they
acted with the requisite degree of care. The presumption of the rule,
however, should not be confused with the plaintiff's entire case-inchief.74 As in any ordinary negligence action, even if the presumption is
rebutted, traditionally, before Cede, plaintiffs prevailed only when they
63. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument, 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989); Block et al., supra
note 8, at 60-66.
64. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 n.2 (Del. 1985).
65. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 191 (Del. 1988); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547
A.2d 963, 970 (Del. 1985).
66. Grobow, 539 A.2d at 191; Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929,939 (Del. 1985).
67. Rosenblatt,493 A.2d at 939.
68. Id.
69. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,950-51 (Del. 1985).
70. Sealy Mattress Co. of N.J. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1331 (Del. Ch. 1987). See also
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264,275 (2d Cir. 1986).
71. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 67 (Del. 1989).
72. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
73. Block et al., supra note 8, at 29.
74. Balotti & Hanks, supranote 39, at 1353. See also supranote 39.
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could also prove causation and damages,75 or the necessity for injunctive
76
relief.
C.

CorporateControl Transactionsand the Business JudgmentRule

Applying the protection of the business judgment rule to corporate
control transactions is controversial." Often, directors attempt to resist
hostile takeovers,78 erect barriers to hostile takeovers,79 or preempt
bidding wars by agreeing to mergers with preferred suitors." Their
resistance to mergers raises the "omnipresent specter" that the directors
are trying to entrench themselves in office at the expense of the
shareholders' interests. 81 Thus, these actions implicate the directors'
duty of loyalty. Because of this inherent conflict, some courts do not
apply the protection of the business judgment rule to defensive tactics.82
The Delaware courts apply the protection of the business judgment
rule to such defensive actions but subject them to a heightened review.8
The court announced in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 84 a twopronged test to determine if a defensive measure is in the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders.85 First, the directors must have
reasonable grounds for believing that a threat to corporate policy exists.86
Second, directors must adopt a measure that is reasonable in relation to
the threat posed.87
An even more stringent test applies if the directors of a target
corporation decide to resist a takeover by selling the corporation to
another, more friendly party. An inevitable sale triggers Revlon duties,
which mandate that the board of directors maximize shareholder
75. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). See also Principles,supranote 8,
§§ 4.01(d), 7.18(c); Folk et al., supranote 8, § 141:28; Lattin, supranote 8, at 276-77.
76. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986).
77. Block et al., supra note 8, at 117.
78. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
79. See, e.g., Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. 1989).
80. Revlon, 506 A.2d 173.
81. Shamrock 559 A.2d at 269; Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
82. Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
83.
84.
85.
86.

Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
Id. at 955.
Id.
Id. In Unocal,the threat was an inadequate and coercive tender offer. Id. at 956.

87. Id. For other states that have adopted the Unocal approach see Block et al., supra note 8, at
136 n.106.
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wealth. 8 A board's primary duty in these instances becomes that of an
auctioneer whose role is to obtain the highest possible price.8 9
Because an auction is one way of obtaining information concerning
the highest value of a company, 90 the directors' due care duty to inform
themselves of the intrinsic worth of the firm is also implicated.
Defensive strategies, such as a pre- or post-agreement market-check9 ' or
a "lock-up, '92 are suspect because an alternative buyer is less likely to
bid once such agreements are in place.93 Therefore, in corporate control
situations, defensive strategies that work to entrench the directors in
office also impede the flow of information regarding the price of the
company. Without adequate information, directors cannot satisfy the due
care element of the business judgment rule.
Seeking a preliminary injunction is the most common means of
challenging a transaction involving control of a corporation. 94 Courts
will grant preliminary injunctions only upon a showing that the plaintiffs
will otherwise suffer irreparable harm without one.9" By enjoining an illinformed decision to sell or merge a corporation, courts remove the
possibility of injury occurring due to a lack of information from the
marketplace; the injury is failure to obtain the higher price shareholders
might receive if an auction were held. Less common are suits against
directors for personal liability stemming from corporate control
transactions. Here, also, most commentators would have agreed that

88. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
89. Id. at 184. See also Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding
directors violated duties by favoring one bidder to put an end to auction). But see Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-51 (Del. 1989) (holding that Revlon
duties not triggered when resistance to tender offer preserves long-term corporate strategy);
Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 844-45 (Del. 1987) (finding that Revlon duties not
applicable in parent-subsidiary context).
90. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 8358, 1991 LEXIS 105, at *54 (Del. Ch. June 21,
1991).
91. A market-check provision allows a target corporation to probe the market for better offers
during a specific period of time in order to test the fairness of the offer. Block et al., supranote 8, at
226.
92. A lock-up option gives a preferred suitor an option to purchas, one or more of a target
company's key assets. Block et al., supranote 8, at 211.
93. Cinerama, 1991 LEXIS 105, at *54.
94. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993);
Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
95. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
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plaintiffs must prove harm in order to win money damages.
however, changed that basic supposition.
II.

Cede,

CEDE & CO. V. TECHNICOLOR, INC.

In Cede, the Delaware Supreme Court jettisoned tort principles from
an analysis of a breach of the duty of care by corporate directors.96 The
court overturned a judgment for the defendant directors of Technicolor,
Inc., in a personal liability action for breach of fiduciary duty. The
Technicolor directors had approved a two-step, cash-out merger97 with
MacAndrews & Forbes Group, Inc. (MAF) at an October, 1982,
meeting.98 In January, 1983, a majority of Technicolor shareholders
voted to approve this merger. Cinerama, Inc., a dissenting Technicolor
shareholder, sued for an appraisal of the value of its shares.99 Cinerama
subsequently filed a second suit seeking money damages for the
directors' breach of their fiduciary duties. Although no breach of loyalty
was found, the Chancellor (Delaware trial court judge) ruled that the
directors had breached their duty of care by failing to meet their Revlon
obligations to sell to the highest bidder.' However, relying on Barnes
v. Andrevs, 0 ' the Chancellor ruled for the defendants because the
96. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
97. A two-step, cash-out merger is a transaction in which an investor acquires control of a
majority of a company's stock by a tender offer and then uses that control to arrange for the
corporation to merge with another corporation controlled by the investor. Block et al., supra note 8,
at 93-94.
98. Cede, 634 A.2d at 356-57. The Technicolor directors approved the merger for $23 per share.
At the time, Technicolor stock was trading at $8.37 per share. Id. at 352.
99. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988). In an appraisal proceeding
under Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 262, shareholders dissenting from a merger on the basis of inadequacy
of the offering price may seek ajudicial determination of the fair value of their shares. Block et al.,
supra note 8, at 97 n.99. Following extended discovery and before deciding the personal liability
action, the court found the fair value of Cinerama's Technicolor stock was $21.60 per share. Cede,
634 A.2d at 350.
100. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1991 LEXIS 105, at *55-*56 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1991).
See supra note 88 and accompanying text for description of Revlon duties.
101. 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). Barnes concerned the liability of a director for the failure of a
corporation due to general mismanagement. Judge Learned Hand, in ruling for the director, stated:
This cause of action rests upon a tort, as much though it be a tort of omission as though it had
rested upon a positive act. The plaintiff must accept the burden of showing that the performance
of the defendant's duties would have avoided loss, and what loss it would have avoided.
* But when a business fails from general mismanagement ... how is it possible to say that a
single director could have made the company successful[?] ... [T]he plaintiff must show that,
had Andrews done his full duty, he could have made the company prosper, or at least could have
broken its fall .... Neither of these has he made any effort to do.
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plaintiff had failed to show that the directors' negligence was the
0 2 Absent proof of self-interest, the
proximate cause of some injury."
Chancellor stated that a shareholder-plaintiff must prove with sufficient
evidence the precise amount of injury flowing firom the directors'
negligence. 3
In overturning the Chancellor's decision, Judge Horsey, writing for
the Delaware Supreme Court, rejected the proximate cause requirement.
Decisional law of the court, he wrote, had always given equal weight to
the duties of care and loyalty.t " The court found its prior precedent
"patently clear" that proof by the plaintiff that defendant directors had
breached the duty of care, even in the absence of self-dealing, shifted the
burden to defendants to prove the entire fairness of the transaction.0 5 No
requirement of a proof of injury was necessary,0 6 and any reliance on
tort principles was inappropriate in a business judgment rule standard of
review."0 7 To rule otherwise, the court stated, would convert the burdenshifting purpose of the business judgment rule into a dispositive finding
on the merits.'
Burden-shifting, the court said, does not create per se
liability but merely dictates the proper standard of review. 9
Accordingly, reliance on the "seventy-year-old" Barnes decision was
inappropriate." 0 The court reversed and remanded the case with
instructions to apply the entire fairness standard of review.",
Significantly, the court stated that the measure of recoverable losses was
not limited to the difference between the appraisal value and the intrinsic
value of the shares. Rather, the Chancellor may "fashion any form of
equitable and monetary relief as may be appropriate, -Including rescissory
damages.""..2
Id. at 616-17.
102. Cinerama, 1991 LEXIS 105, at *58.
103. Id. at *59.
104. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993).
105. Id. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text for explanation of entire fairness review.
106. Id. at 371.
107. Id.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 368.
Id. at371.

112. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983)). Rescissory damages
give the plaintiffs the option of having the value of the stock calculated either as of the time the
damage award is made or at the time of the transaction. In theory, plaintiffs can take back the stock
and resell it to the defendant at current values or take the value of the stock at the time of the
transaction. Rescissory damages give the plaintiffs the benefit of future increases in value, which
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III. CAUSATION AND THE DUTY OF CARE
By eliminating proof of causation and injury from a plaintiff's action
for the breach of the duty of care on a discrete business decision, the
Delaware Supreme Court ignored the historic tort content of that duty.
Mechanically shifting the burden of proof to the directors, once such a
breach of due care is shown, does not comport with the purposes of the
entire fairness review. Courts should require proof of causation and
injury because not all lapses in due care result in harm. Furthermore,
focusing on causation disciplines courts to limit damage awards to those
injuries that reasonably flow from the lapse in care.
A.

EntireFairnessReview Inapplicable

1.

EntireFairnessReview ErroneouslyApplied to Disinterested
Transaction

The Cede court erroneously applied the entire fairness review to a
decision by a disinterested, but uninformed, board of directors. In accord
with its precedents, the court correctly stated that a prerequisite to
applying the business judgment rule was a preliminary finding that the
board was both informed and disinterested."' In that sense, courts do
give "equal weight" to both duties. However, the effects of a breach of
each duty in prior Delaware case law were distinct in keeping with the
distinct nature of each duty." 4 Traditionally, proof by the plaintiff of a
breach of the duty of loyalty automatically invalidated business judgment
rule protection, resulting in a shift to defendant directors to prove the
entire fairness of a decision." 5 The review's exacting standards mirrored
may be attributable to circumstances arising after the transaction. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy
Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981). Technicolor was resold in 1988 for $750 million. Donovan, supra
note 10, at 23. Under a rescissory damages calculation, plaintiffs are seeking the value of the
shareholders' portion of Technicolor's worth at the time of the sale-a calculation that would give
them a $32.8 million award. Id.
113. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
114. See supranotes 31-34 and accompanying text.
115. Thus if a board is interested in a transaction, "the appropriate form of judicial review is to
place upon the board the burden to establish the entire fairness of the transaction. Each of the
second two elements of the rule [good faith and due care] reflects one of the two theoretically
possible bases for director liability in a disinterested transaction." In re RJR Nabisco, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,194, at
91,709-10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (citations omitted); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument
Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (finding that presumption initially attaches in absence of selfdealing); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988) (stating that
when faced with divided loyalties, directors have burden of establishing entire fairness of

1181

Washington Law Review

Vol. 69:1167, 1994

the serious nature of a breach in the duty of loyalty, a breach that
implicates a director's highest fiduciary duty.1 6
On the other hand, prior to Cede, a due care violation alone did not
trigger an entire fairness review. Ultimately, to prevail on a breach of
the duty of care claim, Delaware case law appeared to require plaintiffs
to prove causation and injury as in any typical negligence action.' 7 The
difficulty, however, in pinpointing discussions of the causation and
injury requirements in duty of care actions is that few courts have
addressed corporate control transactions in which the board is
disinterested but has breached its due care duty."' When a board is
interested, the court automatically applies the entire fairness review and
never has to reach the injury requirement.
Despite the paucity of such discussions, nevertheless, there are
Delaware decisions addressing causation and injury for due care
violations. These discussions have occurred under two circumstances:
actions for money damages and preliminary injunctions. The only prior
case to address a pure breach of due care in which money damages were
at stake was Van Gorkom. In that case, unlike in Cede, the court did not
remand for an entire fairness review nor impose rescissory damages.
Instead, it remanded for an assessment of damages consisting of the
difference between the fair value of the share and the price actually
offered." 9 The court, thus, implicitly identified the injury that flowed
from the breach as the higher price shareholders might have received if
the directors had adequately informed themselves. Despite the Cede

transaction); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,954 (Del. 1985) (requiring judicial
examination before protections of business judgment rule conferred when board may be acting in its
own interest); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814-15 (finding business judgment rule inapplicable to
interested board transaction); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (holding that
one standing on both sides of transaction has burden of establishing its ertire fairness).
116. The Cede court's dismissal of the business judgment rule as "merely" a burden shifting
device belies the powerful effect of the entire fairness review. Because the entire fairness review is
so rigorous, determination of the correct standard of judicial review is often determinative of the
outcome of the litigation. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111
(Del. Ch. 1986).
117. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text. The Cede court may have been influenced
by the fact that at least one Technicolor director, if not a second director, may have breached their
duties of loyalty. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 358 (Del. 1993). Nevertheless,
the Chancellor ruled that the Technicolor board as a whole had not breached its duty of loyalty, and
the court upheld that finding. Id. In addition, the court's sweeping language made clear that a
breach of the duty of care alone mandated the entire fairness review. Id. at 368.
118. Block & Hoff, supra note 10, at 5.
119. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
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court's assertion to the contrary, therefore, its most compelling precedent
required causation and injury for a breach of the duty of care.
To grant a request for preliminary injunctive relief, courts similarly
require plaintiffs to prove a likelihood of injury flowing from the breach
of the directors' duties.120 For instance, in Revlon the court granted
injunctive relief because the directors had cut off an active auction for
the target company, reducing competition that might have resulted in a
higher price for shareholders.' 2 ' In Unocal, however, the court refused to
enjoin a board's efforts to defeat a hostile takeover because it found that
the board's efforts were reasonably designed to protect the company
from a coercive tender-offer." In both cases, the court analyzed the
particular injury likely to flow from the alleged breach in the duty of care
if injunctive relief was not granted. Thus, a comparable causation and
injury requirement should also be required for plaintiffs in a full trial
proceeding in which money damages are being sought.
2.

EntireFairnessReview's Objectives Unsuited to Duty of Care
Breach

Mechanical application of the entire fairness review when only a
breach of due care has been proven undermines the objectives of such a
review. The basic purpose of an entire fairness review is to determine
whether a truly independent board would have produced the sameT
The court becomes the objective arbiter for fairness, 2
transaction."
which includes both fair dealing and fair price. 21 In a situation not
involving self-dealing, however, it is unclear how a "fair dealing"
analysis would differ from a Van Gorkom "informed decision-making"
review. 26 The Cede court did not explain how defendants can prove the
presence of fair dealing when they have already been found to have been
grossly negligent in approving the decision.

120. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show both a reasonable probability of
success on the merits and irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted. Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986).
121. Id. at 184-85.
122. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985). See also Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 (Del. 1988) (granting injunction when
auction not designed to bring shareholders highest price reasonably available).
123. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,710 n. 7 (Del. 1983).
124. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993).
125. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
126. Block & Hoff, supra note 10, at 5.
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Furthermore, the Cede court did not distinguish between decisions
implicating corporate control and other director decisions; it merely
asserted that a breach of either fiduciary duty would result in an entire
fairness review. However, the entire fairness standard is typically
applied only to self-dealing transactions in the corporate control setting.
The Cede court gave no guidance on how directors would prove a "fair
price" in situations not involving the sale of the corporation. When the
transaction does not involve a self-dealing transaction or corporate
control decision, the fair-price standard of review has no obvious
application. 127
B.

The Relationship of the Business JudgmentRule to Tort Law

The Cede court incorrectly asserted that tort principles have no place
in a business judgment rule analysis. Though the connection between the
business judgment rule and current tort doctrine is controversial,128 tort

principles naturally lend themselves to an analysis of a breach of the
director's duty of care. Indeed, the very rationale for the business
judgment rule is to provide directors with those protections that other
professionals enjoy in reasonably carrying out their duties. Some
commentators argue that, unlike tort's reasonable person standard,
objective standards do not exist for evaluating direztor decisions. In a
corporate control transaction, however, courts have developed standards
by which to judge director conduct.

127. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v.
Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 275 (Del. Ch. 1989). The court in Shamrock Holdings noted the
oddness of a fairness review in the context of a non-corporate control situation:
This court is unaware of any case where an entire fairness analysis was applied to an ESOP.
Typically, this rigorous standard of review is applied in self-dealing transactions involving a
merger or sale of assets. In the merger context, our Supreme Court has recognized that "fairness
... can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly independent, board of directors acting
upon the matter before them."
Id. at 275 (citations omitted). Thus, the court compares the outcome of a transaction conducted by a
disinterested board to the actual price received and evaluates the price for fairness.
128. For a view supporting tort analysis in the business judgment setting, see Eisenberg, supra
note 19. For a view questioning tort's applicability in the business judgment setting, see Manning,
supranote 23, at 1493-94.
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1.

The Rationalefor the Business Judgment Rule

The business judgment rule is analogous to the "honest errors of
judgment" principle found in negligence cases. 2 9 This principle states
that professionals will not be found liable for a bad outcome if the course
pursued in reaching their decision is recognized as correct by the
profession generally. 3 Likewise, the business judgment rule states that
if all the elements of the rule are met in making a business decision, the
court will not question the merits of the decision. 3' The business
judgment rule, therefore, prevents the inference that a bad decision was
necessarily the product of negligent directors.
Various rationales have been offered to justify the business judgment
rule. Frequently cited are the courts' lack of expertise in business
decision making and the inappropriateness ofjudicial second-guessing. 32
Neither of these is entirely persuasive, however, because courts regularly
review decisions made in the fields of law, medicine, and other
specialties.'33 Moreover, this contention ignores the initial review courts
must make to determine if the elements of the rule have been satisfied.
Perhaps a more persuasive reason is that business decisions, like those
in other professions, are inherently complex and risky,"3 and directors
should not be held liable for all business decisions that have bad
outcomes.'3 5 Directors of large corporations must deal with highly
diversified business operations in which the quality of deliberation on

129. Eisenberg, supranote 19, at 960.
130. Id. at961.
131. However, the business judgment rule's protection is higher because the level of culpability
required for a finding of liability is gross negligence versus ordinary negligence in the normal
malpractice situation. Id. at 963.
132. Block et al., supranote 8, at 6.
133. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided
Notion?, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 287,307 (1994).
134. Manning, supranote 23, at 1482-83.
135. The origin of the rule can be traced back at least 150 years to Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart
(n.s.) 68 (La. 1829) (quoted in Block et al., supranote 8, at 4):
[T]he adoption of a course from which loss ensues cannot make the [director) responsible, if the
error was one into which a prudent man might have fallen. The contrary doctrine seems to ...
require the exercise of perfect wisdom in fallible beings. No man would undertake to render a
service to another on such severe conditions .... The test of responsibility, therefore, should be
... [an] error... of so gross a kind that a man of common sense, and ordinary attention, would
not have fallen into it.
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issues can be constrained by the necessity of a quick response. 3 6 Afterthe-fact litigation cannot recreate the conditions under which directors
make decisions, and the fear is that courts may assign liability on the
basis of poor outcomes, not poor decision making. Especially when a
range of decisions is reasonable, fact finders can easily confuse decisions
that turn out badly with bad decisions.'37 Thus, without the protection
offered by the business judgment rule, talented men and women may not
serve as directors. 38
The duty of care in corporation law has been considered by some
commentators as a special case of the standard of care required
throughout the law of negligence.'3 9 The care required of a doctor,
lawyer, or any other professional in a malpractice case necessarily
demands reference to the applicable community. 41 Similarly, the
reference point for the business judgment rule is the "reasonable person
in the director's circumstances."' 4'
Like malpractice defendants,

136. Manning, supra note 23, at 1481-82. But see Conference Panel Discussion, The Business
Judgment Rule, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 629, 631 (1984) (Prof. Tamar Frankel disputing the necessity of fast
decision making in large corporations).
137. Eisenberg, supranote 19, at 963.
138. Arsht, supra note 48, at 97. Some commentators have argued thst what discourages courts
from reviewing business decisions is the nature of what directors do: overseeing management,
establishing corporate policy, and weighing business decisions. Courts just do not have a good grasp
of the duties of the average director. Manning, supra note 23, at 1494. But see Gevurtz, supra note
133, at 308 (asserting that professional business education contradicts notion that there are no
standards to guide business decision making). This argument may be valid in the context of
evaluating the general oversight functions that directors perform. In the context of a discrete
corporate control transaction, however, courts have developed criteria for evaluating director
decision making. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
139. The concept of gross negligence in tort law actually grew out of the law of mandataries and
gratuitous bailees, to whom corporate directors, usually uncompensated at that time, were compared
in many of the Nineteenth Century cases. Beveridge, supra note 3, at S26. See also Hammond,
supra note 5, at 544 n.3 (explaining that duty of care liability originally based on common law
requirement that directors make reasonable inquiries regarding business).
140. Arsht, supra note 48, at 97. There are rare circumstances in which a court will decide that
the applicable community does not have high enough standards, but the normal reference is to the
"reasonable person" standard in that profession. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519
P.2d 981 (1974), superseded by statute as stated in Meeks v. Marx, 15 Wash. App. 571, 550 P.2d
1158 (1976) (finding physician negligent despite adherence to prevailing standard of care because
reasonable prudence required higher degree of care).
141. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). See also
Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891) (applying reasonable person standard); Norlin Corp.
v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding duty of care requires directors, in
performance of duties, exercise care that ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar
circumstances). Numerous states have also adopted the traditional formulation of the Model
Business Corporation Act § 8.30(a)(2). The comment to this section states that "reference to the
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directors should be held liable only for conduct that is unreasonable. 42
Making an honest error in judgment while exercising due care in the
decision-making process is not negligence.'4 3
Accordingly, the
predominant purpose of the business judgment rule is to bestow the same
protections that other professionals enjoy if sued for malpractice. 44
2.

The Reasonable Directorin the CorporateControl Transaction

Nevertheless, some commentators reject the tort framework because
courts have not developed a clear conception of what a reasonable
director does.'45 Negligence actions presuppose the concept of the
"reasonable person" making a discrete decision or acting in a discrete
event.'46 However, a director's oversight function consists of a flow of
innumerable decisions, actions, judgments, and omissions.'47 Courts,
therefore, cannot adequately determine what is a negligent departure
from the typical behavior of a director.'48
Courts, however, can identify negligent departure from reasonable
director behavior in the corporate control context. In contrast to the flow
of work directors must manage, decisions involving the sale of control of
the corporation are discrete and identifiable. Thus, courts treat corporate
control transactions differently from the general oversight functions that
directors perform.'4 9 They view takeovers or mergers as discrete events,
'ordinarily prudent person' embodies long traditions of the common law." Model Business Corp.
Act § 8.30 official cmt. at 222 (1984).
142. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 170 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter Prosser& Keeton]. Unlike the typical tort case, however, director liability is predicated
on departures from the standard of care that are grossly negligent. This Note does not explore
whether the applicable standard of care should be lowered. See Gevurtz, supra note 133 (arguing
that ordinary negligence should be liability standard for directors).
143. Beveridge, supra note 3, at 939. A gross error in judgment that no reasonably prudent
person would make constitutes an abuse of discretion, not negligence. This is consistent with the
tort principle that the required degree of professional skill is based on the minimum common skill of
members of the profession in good standing. Otherwise, half of any profession would be judged
incompetent. Prosser& Keeton, supranote 142, at 187.
144. Arsht, supra note 48, at 97.
145. Manning, supra note 23, at 1493-94.
146. Id. at 1494.
147. Conference Panel Discussion, supra note 136, at 649 (comments of Prof. Manning). See
also Manning, supra note 23, at 1494 (stating that life of boardroom is continuing flow of
supervisory process punctuated only by occasional discrete transactional decisions).
148. Manning, supra note 23, at 1494. Furthermore, when the charge is inattention or abdication
of responsibility, the business judgment rule does not even apply because there has been no discrete
decision. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984).
149. See supratext accompanying notes 64-71.
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manageable in a conceptual framework, consisting of beginning, middle,
and end. 50
Because of this view, the Delaware courts since Van Gorkom have
established objective benchmarks to analyze whether directors have met
reasonable care standards in corporate control situations. A merger
decision, like the one in Cede, more readily lends itself to the type of
discrete, tort-like analysis that courts are used to making. Thus, courts
can develop standards by which to determine if the correct level of care
was utilized in the decision-making process used for a particular merger
transaction. These standards consist of a laundry list of acts that
directors must perform to make a decision an informed one. 5' By
comparing the actions that the Technicolor directors took in approving
the merger against those standards, the Cede court was able to determine,
essentially as a matter of law, that the Technicolor directors had not used
due care. 52 While this trend of judicial scrutiny has been criticized,'5 3
the courts are not likely to retreat from this course.'54
C.

Proofof Causationand Injury in Corporate ControlTransactions

There are strong theoretical reasons why
demanding proof of causation.'55 Tort law
connection between the act of the defendant and
This requirement recognizes that some boundary

tort law persists in
requires a reasonable
the damage suffered.'5 6
must be established for

150. It is possible to view takeovers as non-discrete events. "All firns are 'in play' from the day
they are created, and the possibility of a later takeover only spurs greater innovation now." David D.
Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 Va. L. Rev. 701, 711
(1987). However, this viev may just be a particularized form of the general problem in torts of what
acts actually constitute sufficient legal causation to require imposition of liability. Prosser &
Keeton, supra note 142, at 264 (stating that, philosophically, consequenzes of an act go forward to
eternity and back to beginning of time).
151. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text regarding other requirements courts have
indicated are important in reaching an informed decision. While the courts have cautioned that the
presence or absence of these factors is not dispositive, other commentators and practitioners
emphasize the necessity of creating a paper trail to fend off shareholder suits. Fischel, supra note 6,
at 1453.
152. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 369-70 (Del. 1993).
153. See Manning, supranote 23.
154. Eisenberg, supranote 19, at 969.
155. Even in strict liability, one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable for harm
"resulting" from the dangerous activity, but is "limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1965). Causal
principles are necessary, therefore, to determine the scope of liability for the harm. H.L.A. Hart &
Tony Honor6, Causationin the Law 288 (2d ed. 1985).
156. Prosser& Keeton, supra note 142, at 264.
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the consequences of any act based upon some idea of social policy." 7
Causal questions, therefore, normally determine not only the existence of
liability but also its extent. 58 Attention to causation principles teaches us
that every lapse in judgment is not automatically coupled with an injury,
and not every injury is the result of negligent action. Tort law does not
bother itself with rectifying a non-injurious lapse in the applicable
standard of care.5 9 It is designed to provide compensation to those
injured for foreseeable damages resulting from negligence. 6
The Cede court, however, asserted that requiring proof of injury
would place an insurmountable burden on the plaintiffs.' 6' The court is
correct in stating that causation is a nettlesome problem, but it has
always been a difficult puzzle in the law. 62 Typically, plaintiffs must
prove both cause-in-fact and proximate cause. 6 Cause-in-fact or "but

157. Id.
158. Hart & Honor6, supra note 155, at 85. Causal issues are also bound up in assigning moral
blame. We blame those who cause harm to others and require that they compensate those whom
they have harmed. Id. at 63.
159. Morally culpable conduct without resulting injury, such as unlawful possession of a firearm,
is typically punished under the criminal laws. Hart & Honor6, supranote 155, at xlvi. This is not to
say that elimination of the causation requirement is unheard of in corporation law. See Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (eliminating causation requirement for implied cause of
action for violation of proxy rules). In Mills, however, the Court eliminated the basic common law
requirement of causation in light of a specific statute. To do otherwise, the Court believed, would
frustrate congressional policy. Id. at 382.
160. George C. Christie & James E. Meeks, Casesand Materialson the Law of Torts 100 (2d ed.
1990). Furthermore, breaches of the duty of care in the corporate sphere typically involve only
economic damages and are spread over a large group of people. It is difficult to understand why
plaintiffs in the corporate arena would not have to prove causation and injury while the victim of
medical malpractice who has suffered a catastrophic injury normally would. Eisenberg, supra note
19, at 964. Also, investors can better compensate for risk by diversifying their investment portfolios
than the victims of other professional malpractice. Davis, supra note 17, at 12-13. All of these
reasons may help explain why the level of culpability necessary to find liability in the director
malpractice area, gross negligence, is higher than in other fields. But see Gevurtz, supra note 133
(arguing directors should be liable for ordinary negligence).
161. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993). The court's
characterization may also have been influenced by the particular predicament of Cinerama. Because
the Chancellor had already determined that the fair value of Cinerama's shares was $21.60 per share,
proving injury would be practically insurmountable for Cinerama. However, the court's answer-to
dispense with causation altogether-is an extreme solution to a particular plaintiff's dilemma.
162. Prosser& Keeton, supra note 142, at 263. We posit a causal relationship between two
events to determine the degree of interdependence between them and to assign blame. If the
probability is high that the absence of a particular event would lead to the occurrence of another
event, we say one event "caused" another even though a confluence of events would be necessary to
reach a particular outcome. The stringency or expansiveness of a court's view on causation issues is
often a policy question. Hart & Honor6, supra note 155, at 5-6.
163. Prosser& Keeton, supranote 142, at 264-65.
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for" causation is particularly problematic in professional malpractice
actions. 1"4 For instance, lawyers and doctors must often make complex
and risky judgments when a range of decisions is reasonable. 6
Distinguishing harms caused by professional negligence from other
factors beyond the professional's control is, therefore, difficult. 6
Likewise, directors confront a large array of choices and combinations of
variables.' 67 An unfavorable outcome in the business setting may be the
result of bad timing, misperceived opportunity, or unexpected
occurrences in the market; it also may be the result of malfeasance,
inattention, or stupidity. Divining which outcomes are the result of
6S
which decisions or combination of decisions is a complex task."
Because of this dilemma, it is tempting to waive proof of causation once
directors are proved negligent. Waiving proof of causation turns
directors, in effect, into insurers for any injury to the corporation that
occurs during the period of their negligent act.'69
An additional problem in the corporate world is that injuries are not
often immediately manifested. While a discrete positive misdeed, such
as embezzlement, is normally followed by quantifiable and obvious harm
to the corporation,17 injuries in the corporate arena are usually financial
and indirect, and their effects are not evident until some time has
passed.'
The same is true in corporate control transactions. For
instance, directors may negligently fail to gather market reports, financial
projections, and similar information regarding the intrinsic worth of the
company prior to approving the sale of the corporation. However, no
one can reconstruct the sale and say with certainty that directors armed
with such information would have received a higher price for
shareholders. 72 The presence of an injury is just not readily apparent
164. Polly A. Lord, Comment, Loss of Chance in Legal Malpractice, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1479
(1986).
165. Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 962.
166. Lord, supranote 164, at 1479.
167. Manning, supra note 23, at 1485.
168. In particular, omissions pose difficult causation problems because a director's failure to act
cannot necessarily be said to have "caused" an injury. Richard B. Dyson, The Director'sLiability
for Negligence, 40 Ind.L.J. 341, 360 (1965). See also Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814,
826 (N.J. 1981) (finding that cases of nonfeasance present more difficult causation question than
those of affirmative acts); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (finding that
there was no clear evidence that any intervention by director would have prevented harm).
169.
170.
171.
172.
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Id. at 359.
Id.
Id. at 360.
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when a decision has resulted in thwarting a hostile takeover or obtaining
a substantial per-share premium in a merger. Therefore, demonstrating
the actual harm with certainty is problematic.
Despite these problems of proof, however, there are persuasive policy
reasons for requiring proof of causation and injury in director negligence
actions. Proper attention to causation issues focuses the judiciary on the
proper size of damages flowing from the breach. Limiting damages is
critical because a particular decision should not expose directors to
monetary damages disproportionate to the breach. Such exposure would
discourage directors from making risky decisions. 73 Risky decisions can
enhance shareholders' overall returns, and ultimately shareholders would
suffer from overly cautious director behavior."'
Moreover, under the Cede standard, plaintiffs may now allege
egregious outcomes flowing from individual negligent acts but do not
have to connect those acts to any identifiable harm. This is exacerbated
by the availability of rescissory damages, whereby plaintiffs may claim
outrageous damage amounts only remotely connected to the alleged
negligent act. Thus, plaintiffs will be encouraged to file suits, and
eager to settle in the face of possible rescissory damage
anxious directors
1 75
awards.
The Cede court is correct, however, in stating that proof of causation
under the Barnes standard can be daunting if the plaintiff must prove to a
virtual certainty what loss would have been avoided but for the directors'
negligence. 76 Barnes involved an action for the failure of a corporation
due to a director's lack of oversight, not a discrete decision. The
causation issue in Barnes, therefore, involved numerous business
decisions over a substantial period of time. Under those conditions, a

173. Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 964.
174. Id.
175. Commentators have stated that "the [Delaware] Supreme Court arguably has created an
environment that has enhanced the settlement value of breach of fiduciary duty claims for
plaintiffs-permitting plaintiffs to pursue litigation (and seek large monetary settlements) beyond the
pleading stage of a litigation although the plaintiffs have in fact not suffered any injury." Block &
Hoff, supra note 10, at 5. Indeed, the Cede decision quickly found its way into other merger cases.
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993) (enjoining merger
because directors did not adequately inform themselves); In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litigation, 634
A.2d 319 (Del. 1993) (relying on Cede and ruling that no proof of injury required once breach of
fiduciary duty is shown).
176. The possible reason the lower court relied on Barnes to analyze the Cede issues is that it is
one of the few cases to discuss causation in director liability actions. One of the problems in
analyzing courts' views on causation in director liability actions is that the issue seems to be
mentioned only when a court feels it disposes of a case. Dyson, supra note 168, at 362.
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director can always point to other factors that could plausibly account for
the demise of the company. Plaintiffs would indeed face an undue
burden proving causation with certainty in such a case. 177 However,
corporate control decisions are different.'7 8 They are discrete decisions
that have clear consequences and are conducted in a particular manner.
Proving the injury resulting from a negligent business decision is
analogous to proving injury from the lawyer who misses the filing
deadline. Identifying the injury that was caused by such a negligent
action presents problems of proof, but the solution is not to throw up our
hands and dispense with proof of causation and injury altogether.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR PROVING CAUSATION AND INJURY IN
CORPORATE CONTROL TRANSACTIONS
Instead of requiring either proof of causation and injury to an absolute
certainty or no causation at all, a better approach is the "substantial lost
chance" doctrine.'7 9 Courts have adopted variations of this standard in
medical misdiagnosis cases,18° and commentators have proposed this
standard for legal malpractice cases.' 8 ' The "substantial lost chance"
approach grew out of courts' frustration with a strict "but for" causation
standard. Medical and legal malpractice cases traditionally demanded
that a plaintiff prove to a virtual certainty that, but for the defendant's

177. This Note does not address causation in the oversight situation. For a discussion of
causation issues in the oversight context, see Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J.
1981).
178. See supranotes 149-54 and accompanying text.
179. The ALI adopted a "substantial factor" test for determining whether the defendant's act or
omission was the cause-in-fact of the loss. While an improvement over the Cede court's approach,
the "substantial factor" test was developed primarily for cases in which application of the "but-for"
rule would allow multiple defendants to escape liability because the conduct of each was not
sufficient to produce a particular result. Prosser& Keeton, supra note 142, at 268. In the corporate
situation, directors act as a group. Potentially, each director may claim that his or her conduct was
less causally significant than others'. This is the problem of concurrent causation. Principles,supra
note 8, § 7.18 cmt. d. Unless a director protested a decision or voted against the decision, however, a
director should not escape liability. Once plaintiffs establish causation for a negligently made
decision, the burden should be on each defendant to prove his or her respective level of culpability.
Alternatively, the directors should be jointly or severally liable. Id. The "substantial lost chance"
approach addresses a different question from the "substantial factor' approach; it determines
whether the board decision in its entirety "caused" any injury at all.
180. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983) (finding
causation for reduction in chance of survival as a result of medical misdiagnosis).
181. Erik M. Jensen, Comment, The Standardof Proofof Causationin Legal Malpractice Cases
63 Cornell L. Rev. 666 (1978); Lord, supranote 164.
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negligence, the plaintiff would not have suffered an injury. 8 2 Medical
misdiagnosis cases required plaintiffs to show that they would not have
deteriorated but for the physician's mistake. 83 Legal malpractice cases
demanded the plaintiff prove that, but for the attorney's negligence, the
plaintiff would have prevailed in the underlying action."' Because few
plaintiffs prevailed under this standard,'
dissatisfaction with the
strictness of
this
approach
has
led
to
proposals
to mitigate its undue
86
harshness.

Courts and commentators have taken novel measures to resolve proof
of causation in medical and legal malpractice cases. Analogous to the
approach that the Cede court took, those novel approaches have included
burden-shiffing.' 87 For instance, in Winter v. Brown, 88 defendant
attorneys missed a statutory deadline rendering plaintiffs claims moot
against a hospital. The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs could still
pursue their case against the doctor, and therefore, damages could not be
ascertained to a certainty. The court, however, shifted the burden of
proof to the defendants to prove damages not attributable to their
negligence because the defendants' own negligence made proof on the
causation issue onerous.1 89
In circumstances analogous to Winter, the court in Cede shifted the
burden to the defendants. The Cede court recognized that the burdenshifting was in part due to the difficult causation issues presented to the
plaintiff.9 ' The problem with burden-shifting in Cede, as well as the
medical and legal fields, is that it fails to deal with the core of the
problem-the lack of a viable causation standard.
In addition,
unreflective burden-shifting can have unintended effects. For instance, it
led the Cede court to impose the awkward entire fairness review, an
imposition that may result in significant personal liability including
rescissory damages.
The substantial lost chance approach is the solution that many courts
and commentators have utilized to deal with the causation problem in the
182. Jensen, supranote 181, at 670.
183. Id. at 679.
184. Id. at 670.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Lord, supra note 164, at 14S0-81.
Jensen, supranote 181, at 673. See, e.g., Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1975).
365 A.2d 381 (D.C. 1976).
Id. at 385.
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993).
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medical and legal fields. Under this standard, when the defendant's
negligent action has effectively terminated a person's chance to recover
in a medical or legal situation, the fact finder may infer causation. 191 The
requirement that the chance be substantial eliminates those cases in
92
which the chance of recovery, medically or legally, was remote.
Similarly, plaintiffs challenging a corporate control transaction should
be required to prove that the directors' failure to inform themselves prior
to a decision was a substantial factor in a lost opportunity. The lost
opportunity would be the higher price shareholders could have received
but for the directors' negligence. "Substantial" opportunity in this
context means that prima facie evidence exists that other probable buyers
were willing to offer a higher price or that the price received fell outside
a reasonable range of prices. 93 In this way, the injury and the lapse in
the duty of care would be temporally and theoretically tied together.
The "substantial lost chance" approach provides a sensible causation
standard and limits damages to those closely connected to the negligent
decisions. Rescissory damages would be available only if the injury
were conceptually linked to and temporally close to the sale of the
company. On the other hand, plaintiffs would not be forced to show
damages to a mathematical certainty. In this way, plaintiffs could still
recover for egregious abuses of directorial power, but directors would
not be exposed to unlimited liability. As a result, director risk-taking
would not be dampened to the detriment of corporate profitability.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Cede court announced that plaintiffs did not have to prove
causation and injury in a corporate control transaction when suing
corporate directors for money damages. Tort principles, it asserted, had
no place in a business judgment rule analysis. However, this assertion
ignores the fundamental nature of a breach of the duty of care as the duty
imposed throughout the law of negligence.'
*[nattention to tort
principles improperly leads to the imposition of the incongruous entire
fairness review upon defendant directors.

191. Jensen, supranote 181, at 67940.
192. Id. at 680.
193. A range of prices is consistent with arm's length bargaining. Davis, supra note 17, at 92
n.325.
194. Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 945.
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Plaintiffs should not prevail on director negligence causes of action
without demonstrating some resulting injury. There are just too many
decisions that directors make in the course of performing their duties that
could rise to the level of "harmless error." To make directors monetarily
liable for these decisions would hinder reasonable corporate risk-taking.
Neither, though, should the burden be insurmountable for the plaintiffs.
The solution is to place the burden on the plaintiff to show a substantial
lost opportunity flowing from the negligence. This standard adequately
balances the interests of directors and shareholders-a balance sorely
lacking in the Cede approach.
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